STACK JACKING

YOUR WAY TO GRSEC/PAX BYPASS

JON OBERHEIDE  DAN ROSENBERG
Introduction

- Jon Oberheide
- Dan Rosenberg
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Introduction

“I get excited every time I see a conference add requirements to their talk selection along the lines of 'exploitation presentations must be against grsecurity/PaX' -- but then there never ends up being any presentations of this kind.”

– spender pratt
Agenda

- A review of Linux kernel security
- Exploitation vs. grsecurity/PaX
- Bypassing grsecurity/PaX
A decade of kernel security

Linux kernel vulnerabilities by year

- 5 vulnerabilities in 2000
- 22 vulnerabilities in 2001
- 16 vulnerabilities in 2002
- 19 vulnerabilities in 2003
- 64 vulnerabilities in 2004
- 106 vulnerabilities in 2005
- 96 vulnerabilities in 2006
- 61 vulnerabilities in 2007
- 67 vulnerabilities in 2008
- 110 vulnerabilities in 2009
A decade of kernel security

Vulnerabilities by CVSS severity

- 2000: 14
- 2001: 9
- 2002: 9
- 2003: 26
- 2004: 52
- 2005: 28
- 2006: 13
- 2007: 35
- 2008: 34
- 2009: 57
Upstream attitude

Btw, and you may not like this, since you are so focused on security, one reason I refuse to bother with the whole security circus is that I think it glorifies - and thus encourages - the wrong behavior.

It makes "heroes" out of security people, as if the people who don't just fix normal bugs aren't as important.

In fact, all the boring normal bugs are _way_ more important, just because there's a lot more of them. I don't think some spectacular security hole should be glorified or cared about as being any more "special" than a random spectacular crash due to bad locking.

- Security is hard when upstream ignores the problems
- Linux still hasn't had its “security awakening”
How about last year?

- 142 CVE's assigned
  - 30% worse than the previous worst year (2009)
  - Based on public CVE requests, issues tracked at Red Hat Bugzilla, and Eugene's tagged git tree
  - Missing dozens of non-CVE vulnerabilities (i.e. the “Dan Carpenter factor”)
- 61 (43%) discovered by six people
  - Kees (4), Brad (3), Tavis (7), Vasilyi (4), Dan (37), Nelson (6)
Kernel vulns in 2010

- 12 known exploits for local privilege escalation
- 13 remotely triggerable issues
- 33 potential privilege escalations
Breakdown by Target

- Core: 76
- Distro: 31
- Exotic: 33
- Red Hat: 2
Breakdown by Impact:

- **Bypass**: 65
- **DOS**: 30
- **Info**: 7
- **Priv Esc?**: 1
- **Priv Esc**: 26
- **Nothing**: 13

Legend:
- Bypass
- DOS
- Info
- Priv Esc?
- Priv Esc
- Nothing
Interesting exploits of 2010

- full-nelson.c
  - Combined three vulns to get a NULL write
- half-nelson.c
  - First Linux kernel stack overflow (not buffer overflow) exploit
- linux-rds-exploit.c
  - Arbitrary write in RDS packet family
- i-CAN-haz-MODHARDEN.c
  - SLUB overflow in CAN packet family
- american-sign-language.c
  - Exploit payload written in ACPI's ASL/AML
Agenda

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Traditional Linux exploitation

• Perhaps most general exploitation primitive is an arbitrary kernel write
• Sometimes occurs naturally, other times can be constructed (e.g. overwriting pointers in an overflow to trigger a write)
Linux exploitation examples

- Writes to known addresses (IDT)
- Function pointer overwrites
- Redirecting control flow to userspace
- Influencing privesc-related kernel data (eg. credentials structures)
- Relying on kallsyms and other info
Overview of grsecurity/PaX

• grsecurity/PaX
  • Third-party patchset to harden Linux userspace/kernel security

• Attempts to prevent
  • Introduction/execution of arbitrary code
  • Execution of existing code out of original order
  • Execution of existing code in original order with arbitrary data
grsecurity/PaX hardening

- Kernel hardening features:
  - KERNEXEC
    - Prevent the introduction of new executable code
  - UDEREF
    - Prevent invalid userspace pointer dereferences
  - HIDESYM
    - Hide info that may be useful to an attacker (kallsyms, slabinfo, kernel address leaks, etc)
  - MODHARDEN
    - Prevent auto-loading of crappy unused packet families (CAN, RDS, econet, etc)
Agenda

- A review of Linux kernel security
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- Bypassing grsecurity/PaX
The main event

- A technique we call **stackjacking**
  - Enables the bypass of common grsecurity/PaX configurations with common exploit primitives
  - Independently discovered, collaboratively exploited, with slightly different techniques
Plan of attack!

STACK JACkING OVERVIEW

PRIMITIVES

???

???

???
Target kernel assumptions

- Hardened kernel with grsec/PaX
  - Config level GRKERNSEC_HIGH
  - KERNEXEC
  - UDEREF
  - HIDESYM
  - MODHARDEN
  - Etc...
Stronger target assumptions

- Let's make some extra assumptions
  - We like a challenge, and these are assumptions that may possibly be obtainable now or in the future
- Stronger target assumptions
  - Zero knowledge of kernel address space
  - Fully randomized kernel text/data
  - Cannot introduce new code into kernel address space
  - Cannot modify kernel control flow (eg. data-only)
Attacker assumption #1

• Assumption: arbitrary kmem write
  • A common kernel exploitation primitive
  • Examples: RDS, MCAST_MSFILTER
  • Other vulns can be turned into writes, e.g. overflowing into a pointer that's written to

• Wut?
  • “You mean I can't escalate privs with an arbitrary kernel memory write normally?” NOPE.
Arbitrary write into the abyss

0xffffffff
kernel

DARKNESS!

No clue where to write!
Exploitation is infeasible.

0xc0000000
(TASK_SIZE)

user

0x00000000

Stackjacking Your Way to grsecurity/PaX Bypass – Jon Oberheide / Dan Rosenberg
What's the secret sauce?

ARBITRARY WRITE + ? = <3
Maybe?

ARBITRARY WRITE + quine? = <3
Nah, he's taken + = <3
Need to know something

- One way: arbitrary kmem disclosure
  - procfs (2005)
  - sctp (2008)
  - move_pages (2009)
  - pktcdvd (2010)
- Just dump entire address space!
  - But these are rare!
  - And in many instances, mitigated by grsec/PaX
Something more common?

• How about a more common vuln?
• Hints…
  • Widely considered to be a useless vulnerability
  • Commonly assigned a CVSS score of 1.9 (low)
  • 25+ such vulnerabilities reported in 2010
  • Often referred to as a Dan Rosenbug
• Can you guess it???
KSTACK MEM MEM DISCLOSURE!

**ARBITRARY WRITE** + **KSTACK LEAK** = <3
How does kstack leak help?

WE NEED TO GO DEEPER
A bit about Linux kernel stacks

- Each userspace thread is allocated a kernel stack
- Stores stack frames for kernel syscalls and other metadata
- Most commonly 8k, some distros use 4k
  - \[\text{THREAD\_SIZE} = 2 \times \text{PAGE\_SIZE} = 2 \times 4086 = 8192\]
Kernel stack mem disclosures

- **Kstack mem disclosures**
  - Leak of memory from the kernel stack to userspace

- **Common cause**
  - Copying a struct on the kstack back to userspace with uninitialized fields
  - Improper initialization/memset, forgetting member assignment, structure padding/holes
  - A frequent occurrence, especially in compat
Kernel stack mem disclosures

1) process makes syscall and leaves sensitive data on kstack

2) kstack is reused on subsequent syscall and struct overlaps with sensitive data

3) foo struct is copied to userspace, leaking 4 bytes of kstack through uninitialized foo.leak member

```c
struct foo {
    uint32_t bar;
    uint32_t leak;
    uint32_t baz;
};

syscall() {
    struct foo;
    foo.bar = 1;
    foo.baz = 2;
    copy_to_user(foo);
}
```
Thanks ddz!

Initializing memory makes it a predictable value for attackers. Keep memory uninitialized for extra randomization and obfuscation.

Retweeted by dannyTheMonkey and others
Plan of attack!

STACK JACKING OVERVIEW

Arbitrary write
Kstack disclosure

ROOT

???

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What's useful on the kstack?

• Leak data off kstack?
  • Sensitive data left behind? Not really...

• Leak addresses off kstack?
  • Sensitive addresses left behind? Maybe...
    • Pointers to known structures could be exploited
    • Too specific of an attack!

• Need something more general
  • kstack disclosures differ widely in size/offsets
Kernel stack addresses

• How about a leaking an address that:
  • Is stored on the stack; and
  • Points to an address on the stack

• These are pretty common
  • Eg. pointers to local stack vars, saved ebp, etc

• But what does this gain us?
Kernel stack self-discovery

- If we can leak an pointer to the kstack off the kstack, we can calculate the base address of the kstack

\[
\text{kstack\_base} = \text{addr} \& \sim(\text{THREAD\_SIZE} - 1);
\]

\[
\text{kstack\_base} = 0xcdef1234 \& \sim(8192 - 1)
\]

\[
\text{kstack\_base} = 0xcdef0000
\]

We call this \textit{kstack self-discovery}
Effective kstack discovery

• Not all kstack disclosures are alike
  • May only leak a few bytes, non-consecutive
  • How do we effectively self-discover?

• Manual analysis
  • Figure out where kstack leak overlaps addresses

• Automatic analysis
  • libkstack
Manual kstack self-discovery

- Manual, offline analysis
  - 1. prime stack with random syscall
  - 2. leak bytes, see if any leaks match real kstack
  - 3. repeat until we've collected enough bytes
  - 4. construct list of priming syscalls needed for the particular leak to spill the beans
Automatic with libkstack

- We can automate this process for runtime self-discovery with libkstack
  - 1. prime stack with random syscall
  - 2. leak bytes, infer whether bytes belong to a kstack addr
  - 3. repeat until we have sufficient confidence to calculate the kstack base addr
Plan of attack!

- STACK SELF-DISCOVERY
  - Manual analysis
  - Auto with libkstack
- STACK JACKING OVERVIEW
- ROOT

Arbitrary write
Kstack disclosure
No longer complete darkness

A random pinpoint of light!

We can self-discover kstack address! Exploitation is...maybe feasible?
The next step

• We now have a tiny island
  • Use arbitrary write to modify anything on kstack

• Where to write?
  • Pointers, data, metadata on kstack

• What to write?
  • No userspace addrs (UDEREF), limited kernel

• Game over? Not yet!
Anything else of interest on the kstack???

Metadata on kernel stack

current_thread_info

stack_pointer

start of stack

grows down

thread_info

used

high address

4k/8k stack

low address

thread_info struct stashed at base of kstack!
thread_info candidates

```
struct thread_info {
    struct task_struct *task;
    struct exec_domain *exec_domain;
    __u32 flags;
    __u32 status;
    __u32 cpu;
    int preempt_count;
    mm_segment_t addr_limit;
    struct restart_block restart_block;
    void __user *sysenter_return;

    #ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
    unsigned long previous_esp;
    __u8 supervisor_stack;
    #endif

    int uaccess_err;
};
```

• What can we modify within thread_info to escalate privs?
struct thread_info {
    struct task_struct *task;
    struct exec_domain *exec_domain;
    __u32 flags;
    __u32 status;
    __u32 cpu;
    __u32 preempt_count;
    mm_segment_t addr_limit;
    struct restart_block restart_block;
    void __user *sysenter_return;

    #ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
    unsigned long previous_esp;
    __u8 supervisor_stack;
    #endif

    int uaccess_err;
};

- **restart_block**
  - Has a func ptr we can overwrite and invoke via userspace!
  - Can't point to userspace (UDEREF)
  - Can't point to kmem (blackbox)
  - Plus assuming no control flow mod
task_struct pointer?

struct thread_info {
    struct task_struct *task;
    struct exec_domain *exec_domain;
    __u32 flags;
    __u32 status;
    __u32 cpu;
    int preempt_count;
    mm_segment_t addr_limit;
    struct restart_block restart_block;
    void __user *sysenter_return;
    #ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
    unsigned long previous_esp;
    __u8 supervisor_stack;
    #endif
    int uaccess_err;
};

- task_struct?
  - Could point it at init_task_struct for getting creds/caps of the init task
  - But we don't know the address of init_task_struct!
Attacking task_struct

struct thread_info {
    struct task_struct *task;
    ...
};

struct task_struct {
    ...
    const struct cred *real_cred;
    const struct cred *cred;
    ...
};

struct cred {
    ...
    uid_t uid;
    gid_t gid;
    ...
};

- task_struct->creds?
  - Modify creds of our process directly to escalate privileges?
  - But in order to write task_struct->creds, we need to know the address of task_struct!
  - If we could read the address of task_struct off the end of the kstack, we might win!
Connecting the dots

Expanding our visibility

If we can read off the kstack, we can find task_struct/creds!
Attacking task_struct

- We have write+kleak
  - Can we turn this into an arbitrary read?
- If we can get arbitrary read:
  - Read base of kstack to find address of task_struct
  - Read task_struct to find address of creds struct
  - Write into creds struct to set uids/gids/caps
  - Spawn a root shell!
Plan of attack!

STACK JACKING OVERVIEW

STACK SELF-DISCOVERY
- Manual analysis
- Auto with libkstack

STACK GROPING
- ???

STACK JACKING
- Read thread / task
- Overwrite creds

Arbitrary write
Kstack disclosure

ROOT
The Rosengrope Technique

FUN WITH KERNEL_DS
struct thread_info {
    struct task_struct *task;
    struct exec_domain *exec_domain;
    __u32 flags;
    __u32 status;
    __u32 cpu;
    int preempt_count;
    mm_segment_t addr_limit;
    struct restart_block restart_block;
    void __user *sysenter_return;
    #ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
    unsigned long __u32 previous_esp;
    __u8 supervisor_stack;
    #endif
    int uaccess_err;
};
Vanilla kernel

- No segmentation, user/kernel separation enforced by paging
- `copy_*_user` functions check user pointers against `addr_limit` (per-thread variable in `thread_info` struct)
- On vanilla, setting `addr_limit` to `KERNEL_DS` (ULONG_MAX) gives arbitrary read/write (all checks pass)
set_fs()

- Sometimes kernel wants to reuse code with kernel pointer arguments
  - `kernel_sendmsg`, `kernel_recvmsg`, etc.
- Calls `set_fs(KERN_DS)` to set `addr_limit` and allow `copy_*_*_user` functions to copy kernel-to-kernel
- Careful to make sure no user-influenced pointers are used
PAX_UDEREF

- Strict user/kernel separation using segmentation
- Reload segment registers at kernel traps, used during copy operations
  - Fault on invalid access
PAX_UDEREFS and KERNEL_DS

- Use %gs register to keep track of segment for source/dest of copy
- set_fs(KERNEL_DS) sets addr_limit and reloads %gs register to contain __KERNEL_DS segment selector
No more easy root...

- Writing KERNEL_DS to addr_limit is no longer sufficient
- Access checks on pointers will pass, but we'll still fault in copy functions because of incorrect segment registers
But...

- `%gs register is reloaded on context switch (necessary to keep track of thread state)
- Reloaded based on contents of `addr_limit`!
Using KERNEL_DS trick

- Write KERNEL_DS into addr_limit of current thread

- Loop on write(pipefd, addr, size)
  - Eventually, thread will be scheduled out at right moment (before copy_from_user)
  - When thread resumes, %gs register will be reloaded with __KERNEL_DS, and read target will be copied into pipe buffer (kernel-to-kernel copying)

- Restore addr_limit and read
Plan of attack!

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ROOT
Pros and cons of KERNEL_DS

- **The Rosengrope technique**
  - Pros: clean, simple, generic method to obtain arbitrary read from write+kleak
  - Cons: depends on knowing the location of addr_limit member of thread_info
  - It's possible to move thread_info out of the kstack!

- **Any alternatives?**
  - Let's get a bit crazier...
The Obergrope Technique

HOW CAN WE GET A READ?
Clobber a process' kernel stack frame while it's in a system call?
Attacking the kstack frames

• The Obergrope technique
  • Don't attack the thread_info metadata on kstack
  • Attack the kstack frames themselves!

• End goal is a *read*
  • How to read data by writing a kstack frame?
Observations

• Lots of kernel codepaths copy data to userland, via `copy_to_user()`, `put_user()`, etc
• There may be `copy_to_user()` calls that use a source address argument that is, at some point, stored on the kernel stack
• If we can overwrite that source address on the kstack, we can control source of the `copy_to_user()` and leak data to userspace
A problem

• How can we write to our own kstack?
  • Unlikely to be able to write into our own stack while exploiting the vulnerability for our arbitrary write

• Use parent/child processes
  • Child self-discovers kstack addr
  • Passes kstack addr to parent
  • Parent writes into child while child is in syscall
More problems

• How can we write to stack reliably?
• We have a tricky race to win:
  • Parent needs to write into child's kstack between when the copy_to_user() source register is pushed and popped from the kstack
• This is a very small race window...
Winning Linux kernel races

• How to win Linux kernel races
  • Get very lucky w/scheduling on SMP machine
  • Cause a resource to be in contention (eg. locks)
  • Cause kernel to page in from slow I/O device (sgrakkyu)

• Ehhh...
  • We might hose the kernel if we lose the race
  • Anything better?
A twist on winning races

• This isn't a “standard” race though
  • We can have child execute ANY codepath that performs copy_to_user() with a src arg on kstack

• Enter, sleepy syscalls!
  • Syscalls that allow us to put process to sleep for an arbitrary amount of time
  • nanosleep, wait, select, etc
Sleepy syscall conditions

• Any of these sleepy syscalls have our required conditions?

• Needs to:
  • Push a register to the stack
  • Go to sleep for an arbitrary amount of time
  • Pop that register off the stack
  • Use that register as the source for copy_to_user()
compat_sys_waitid

asmlinkage long compat_sys_waitid(int which, compat_pid_t pid, struct compat_siginfo __user *uinfo, int options, struct compat_rusage __user *uru)
{
    struct rusage ru;
...
    ret = sys_waitid(which, pid, (siginfo_t __user *)&info,
                       uru ? (struct rusage __user *)&ru : NULL);
...
    ret = put_compat_rusage(&ru, uru);
...
}

int put_compat_rusage(const struct rusage *r, struct compat_rusage __user *ru)
{
    if (!access_ok(VERIFY_WRITE, ru, sizeof(*ru)) ||
        __put_user(r->ru_utime.tv_sec, &ru->ru_utime.tv_sec) ||
...
compat_sys_waitid disasm

Dump of assembler code for function compat_sys_waitid:
... 0xffffffff810aba4e <+62>: lea -0x140(%rbp),%r14
... 0xffffffff810aba8b <+123>: callq 0xffffffff81063b70 <sys_waitid>
... 0xffffffff810abaae <+158>: mov %r14,%rdi
  0xffffffff810abab1 <+161>: callq 0xffffffff810aa700 <put_compat_rusage>
...

Dump of assembler code for function sys_waitid:
... 0xffffffff81063bf9 <+137>: callq 0xffffffff810637e0 <do_wait>
...

Dump of assembler code for function do_wait:
... 0xffffffff810637e6 <+6>: push %r14
  ... PROCESS GOES TO SLEEP HERE
  ... 0xffffffff810639fb <+539>: pop %r14
...

1) compat_sys_waitid() stores address of ru in r14
2) compat_sys_waitid() calls sys_waitid()
3) sys_waitid() calls do_wait()
4) do_wait() pushes r14 on kstack
5) do_wait() sleeps indefinitely
6) we clobber the saved r14 reg on the kstack
7) do_wait() wakes up
8) do_wait() pops r14 off the kstack
9) do_wait() returns
10) sys_waitid() returns
11) compat_sys_waitid() calls put_compat_rusage()
12) put_compat_rusage() uses clobbered source addr
13) put_user() copies from source addr to userspace
compat_sys_waitid reliability

- Is this reliable across kernel versions?
  - Yes, tested on:
    - Lucid default build vmlinuz-2.6.32-24-generic
    - Lucid custom build vmlinuz-2.6.32.26+drm33.12
    - Vanilla build vmlinuz-2.6.36.3
    - Vanilla build + grsec vmlinuz-2.6.36.3-grsec

- How about compilers?
  - Across most gcc 4.x? Needs more investigation
  - Potentially could runtime fingerprint compiler
High-level exploit flow

1. jacker forks/execs groper
2. groper gets its own kstack addr
3. groper passes kstack addr up to jacker
4. groper forks/execs helper
5. helper goes to sleep for a bit
6. groper calls waitid on helper
7. jacker overwrites the required offset on groper's stack
8. helper wakes up from sleep
9. groper returns from waitid
10. groper leaks task_struct address back to userspace
11. groper passes leaked address back up with jacker
12. steps 4-11 are repeated to leak task/cred addresses
13. jacker modifies groper's cred struct in-place
14. groper forks off a root shell
Plan of attack!

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- Obergrope technique

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Arbitrary write
Kstack disclosure

ROOT
Live demo!

- Exploit against live hardened system...
Defenses?

- Mitigate the exploitation vectors?
  - Remove thread_info metadata from kstack
  - RANDKSTACK? Could make things worse...
- Eliminate all kstack disclosures?
  - Clear kstack between syscalls?
  - Compiler/toolchain magic?
- ???
What happened in a week?

- thread_info struct moved off kstack
- 64-bit kstack randomization
- Other grsec/PaX goodies
- Hurt feelings
- Internet drama
- Long blogposts (from both sides) no one will read
Flex Those Op Muscles

18:31 -!- spender [~spender@grsecurity.net] has joined #grsecurity
18:31 -!- mode/#grsecurity [+o spender] by ChanServ
18:31 -!- mode/#grsecurity [+b !*jono@208.64.36.*] by spender
18:31 -!- jono was kicked from #grsecurity by spender [don't shit where you eat]
18:32 -!- mode/#grsecurity [+b !*bliss@*.hsd1.ma.comcast.net] by spender
18:32 -!- drosenbe was kicked from #grsecurity by spender [don't shit where you eat]
What spender fixed

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Greetz

- #busticati

- $1$kk1q85Xp$ld.gAcJOG7uelf36VQwJQ/

- ;PpPppPpPpPPPpP
QUESTIONS?

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