Anatomy of a Remote Kernel Exploit

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Who am I?

- Security consultant and vulnerability researcher at Virtual Security Research in Boston
  - App/net pentesting, code review, etc.
  - Published some bugs
  - Rooted a few Android phones
  - Focus on Linux kernel
  - Research on kernel exploitation and mitigation
Agenda

▪ Motivation

▪ Challenges of remote exploitation

▪ Prior work

▪ Case study: ROSE remote stack overflow
  ▫ Exploitation
  ▫ Backdoor

▪ Future work
Motivation

Why am I giving this talk?
Why Remote Kernel Exploits?

▪ Instant root
  ▫ No need to escalate privileges

▪ Remote userland exploitation is hard!
  ▫ Full ASLR + NX/DEP
  ▫ Sandboxing
  ▫ Reduced privileges
Goals of This Talk

▪ Sorry, not actually an amateur radio talk
▪ Exploit development methodology
▪ Individual bugs vs. exploit techniques
▪ Discuss next steps for kernel hardening
Challenges of Remote Kernel Exploitation

Wait, so you mean this is kind of hard?
Warning: Fragile

- Consequence of failed remote userland exploit:
  - Crash application/service, wait until restarted
  - Crash child process, try again immediately

- Consequence of failed remote kernel exploit:
  - Kernel panic, game over
Lack of Environment Control

▪ Typical local kernel exploit:
  ▫ Can trigger allocation of heap structures
  ▫ Can trigger calling of function pointers
  ▫ High amount of information leakage available to local users

▪ Remote kernel exploit:
  ▫ ?
Escape From Interrupt Context

- Many remote kernel issues occur in interrupt context
  - Asynchronous networking events

- End goal: userland code execution (remote shell)
  - How do we get there?
  - No process backing execution

- Need to transition
  - Interrupt context to process context to userland
Prior Work

What's been done before?
A Few Statistics

- 18 known exploits for 16 vulnerabilities
  - 19 authors
  - 9 with full public source code
  - 3 with partial or PoC source

- Wide range of platforms
  - Solaris and OS X still need some remote love
By Vulnerability Class

- Stack Overflow: 12
- Heap Overflow: 3
- Array Indexing: 1

Legend:
- Stack Overflow
- Heap Overflow
- Array Indexing

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Highlights

▪ Barnaby Jack: Step into the Ring 0 (August 2005)
  ▫ First publication on remote kernel exploitation
  ▫ Transition to userland and kernel backdoor

▪ Sinan Eren: GREENAPPLE (May 2006)
  ▫ First remote kernel exploit in Immunity CANVAS
Highlights (cont.)

- hdm, skape, Johnny Cache (November 2006)
  - Broadcom, Dlink, and Netgear wifi drivers
  - First remote kernel exploits in Metasploit

- Alfredo Ortega, Gerardo Richarte: OpenBSD IPv6 mbuf overflow (April 2007)
  - First public remote kernel heap overflow
  - Bypasses userland NX
Highlights (cont.)

▪ Kostya Kortchinsky: MS08-001 (January 2008)
  ▫ Immunity CANVAS
  ▫ First publicized remote Windows kernel pool overflow

▪ sgrakkyu: sctp-houdini (April 2009)
  ▫ First remote Linux sl*b overflow
  ▫ Introduced vsyscall trick to transition from interrupt context to userland
Observations

▪ Majority stack overflows, but none dealt with NX kernel stack
  ▫ Let's fix that

▪ No Linux interrupt context stack overflows
  ▫ sgrakkyu and twiz showed us how in Phrack 64, let's do it in real life

▪ Wireless drivers suck
  ▫ Six 802.11 remote kernel exploits
Building the Exploit

Or: How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the Ham
Target: 32-bit x86 PAE Kernel

- Kernel has NX support (CONFIG_DEBUG_RODATA)
  - Only enforced on PAE (32-bit) or 64-bit kernels

- Can't execute first-stage shellcode on kernel stack

- Can't introduce code into userspace without proper page permissions

- No vsyscall trick for easy transitions
Test Setup

- Attacker and victim VMs (Ubuntu 10.04)
- Debugging using KGDB over virtual serial port (host pipe)
- BPQ (AX.25 over Ethernet)
- Except for glue code, exploit written entirely in x86 assembly
Debian Security Advisory DSA-2240-1:

Dan Rosenberg reported two issues in the Linux implementation of the Amateur Radio X.25 PLP (Rose) protocol. A remote user can cause a denial of service by providing specially crafted facilities fields.
Intro to ROSE

- Rarely used amateur radio protocol
- Provides network layer on top of AX.25's link layer
- Uses 10-digit addresses and AX.25 callsigns
- Static routing only
CVE-2011-1493

- On initiating a ROSE connection, parties exchange facilities (supported features)

- FAC_NATIONAL_DIGIS allows host to provide list of digipeaters

- Parsing for this field reads length value from frame and copies digipeater addresses without bounds checking, causing a stack overflow
Sad Code :-(

...  
\[
l = p[1];
\]
...

else if (*p == FAC_NATIONAL_DIGIS) {
    fac_national_digis_received = 1;
    facilities->source_ndigis = 0;
    facilities->dest_ndigis   = 0;
    for (pt = p + 2, lg = 0 ; lg < l ; pt += AX25_ADDR_LEN, lg += AX25_ADDR_LEN) {
            memcpy(&facilities->dest_digis[facilities->dest_ndigis++], pt, AX25_ADDR_LEN);
        else
            memcpy(&facilities->source_digis[facilities->source_ndigis++], pt, AX25_ADDR_LEN);
    }
}  
...
Constraint #1

▪ The seventh byte of an AX.25 address is AND'd with AX25_HBIT (0x80) if it's a destination digipeater
  ▫ Otherwise, treated as a source digipeater

▪ Every seventh byte of our payload needs to be consistently greater or less than 0x80, or we'll copy into the wrong array

▪ Requires manual tweaking
Plan of Attack

- Get EIP
- Unrestricted code execution
- Install kernel backdoor
- Restore and recover
Triggering the Bug

- Fairly trivial

- Modify ROSE facilities output functions to craft frame with overly large length field for FAC_NATIONAL_DIGIS, followed by lots of NOPs (0x90)
| ROSE header | Facilities Total Length = XX | 0x00 | FAC_NATIONAL | FAC_NATIONAL_DIGIS | len = 0xff | 0x9090... |
Got EIP

- Recompile ROSE module, reload, and use rose_call to initiate connection to target

- Overflowed softirq stack (interrupt handler)

Program received signal SIGSEGV, Segmentation fault.
[Switching to Thread 1456]
0x90909090 in ?? ()
(gdb) i r
eax            0x0    0
ecx            0xde3a5f3c -566599876
edx            0x296   662
ebx            0x90909090 -1869574000
esp            0xd11e199c 0xd11e199c
ebp            0x90909090 0x90909090
esi            0x90909090 0x90909090
edi            0x90909090 -1869574000
eip            0x90909090 0x90909090
eflags         0x10286   [ PF SF IF RF ]
cs             0x60    96
ss             0x68   104
ds             0x9090007b -1869610885
es              0x9090007b -1869610885
fs              0xffff 65535
gs              0xffff 65535
How to Execute Code?

- Traditionally, return into shellcode on stack
- Problem 1: we don't know where we are
  - Trampolines are easy
- Problem 2: softirq stack is non-executable

1. Get EIP
2. Unrestricted code execution
3. Install kernel backdoor
4. Restore and recover
Review: ROP

▪ We control the return address and data at %esp

▪ Each return will direct execution to address at stack pointer and increment it

▪ Chain together function epilogues (“gadgets”) to perform arbitrary computation

▪ Relies on homogeneity of distribution (binary) kernels and lack of randomization
  ▫ Choose gadgets that are more likely to appear in constant locations across kernels
Making our Stack Executable

- Kernel has nice function to do this for us:
  - set_memory_x()

- Calling convention has arguments in registers

- ROP stub steps:
  - Load (%esp & ~0xffff) into %eax
  - Load 4 into %edx
  - Call set_memory_x()
  - Jump into stack

```
static unsigned long rop_stub[] = {
    PUSH_ESP_POP_EAX,
    0xffffffff,
    0xffffffff,
    0xffffffff,
    0xffffffff,
    0xffffffff,
    0xffffffff,
    RET,
    POP_EDX,
    0x00000004,
    0xffffffff,
    0xffffffff,
    0xffffffff,
    0xffffffff,
    RET,
    SET_MEMORY_X,
    JMP_ESP,
};
```
Overcoming Space Constraints

- We now have traditional shellcode executing on the softirq stack!

- Problem: length is limited to 0xff (255), minus what we've already used

- Not enough room for a useful payload
Needle in a Haystack

- Full ROSE frame is intact somewhere on the kernel heap

- Pointer to a memory region containing our socket data lives on the stack

- Walk up the stack, following kernel heap pointers

- Search general area for tag included in ROSE frame

- Mark it executable and jump to it
What Now?

▪ We can execute arbitrary-length payloads now!

▪ Goal: install kernel backdoor in ICMP handler
Protocol Handlers

/* Array of network protocol structure */
const struct net_protocol __rcu *
*inet_protos[MAX_INET_PROTOS] __read_mostly;

/* Definition of network protocol structure */
struct net_protocol {
    int   (*handler)(struct sk_buff *skb);
    void (*err_handler)(struct sk_buff *skb, u32 info);
    ...
};

/* Standard well-defined IP protocols. */
enum {
    IPPROTO_IP = 0,    /* Dummy protocol for TCP */
    IPPROTO_ICMP = 1,  /* Internet Control Message Protocol */
    ...
};

Hooking ICMP

▪ Storage on softirq stack
  ▫ Already executable, safe, persistent

▪ Copy hook and address of original ICMP handler
  ▫ We'll need this later

▪ Handler is in read-only memory
  ▫ Flip write-protect bit in %cr0 register

▪ Write address of our hook into ICMP handler function pointer
Hooked In

inet_protos:
- IPPROTO_IP
- IPPROTO_ICMP
- ...

net_protocol:
- handler
- err_handler
- ...

hook:
- <hook>: push edi
- <hook+1>: push esi
- <hook+2>: push ebx
- <hook+3>: push eax
- ...

icmp_rcv:
- <icmp_rcv>: push ebp
- <icmp_rcv+1>: mov ebp,esp
- <icmp_rcv+3>: push edi
- <icmp_rcv+4>: push esi
- ...

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Time to Rebuild...

- We've destroyed large portions of the softirq stack
- How can we keep the kernel running?

Get EIP

Unrestricted code execution

Install kernel backdoor

Restore and recover
Cleaning Up the Locks

- ROSE protocol is holding two spinlocks
  - If we don't release these, the ROSE stack will deadlock soon

- Problem: ROSE is a module, we don't know where the locks live
Needle in a Haystack, Again

▪ Global modules variable: linked list of loaded kernel modules

▪ A plan!
  ▫ Follow linked list until we find ROSE module
  ▫ Read module structure, find start of .data section
  ▫ Scan .data section for byte pattern of two consecutive spinlocks (distinctive signature)
  ▫ Release them
Preemption Woes

- Preemption count must be consistent with what the kernel is expecting, or scheduler will...

...complain and fix it for you?!

```c
if (unlikely(prev_count != preempt_count())) {
    printk(KERN_ERR "huh, entered softirq %u %s %p" 
            "with preempt_count %08x," 
            " exited with %08x?\n", vec_nr, 
            softirq_to_name[vec_nr], h->action, 
            prev_count, preempt_count());
    preempt_count() = prev_count;
}
```

- Let's avoid that warning...
Has Anybody Seen a Preemption Count?

- Preempt count lives at known location in thread_info struct, at base of kernel stack:

```c
struct thread_info {
    struct task_struct  *task; /* main task structure */
    struct exec_domain  *exec_domain; /* execution domain */
    __u32 flags;         /* low level flags */
    __u32 status;        /* thread synchronous flags */
    __u32 cpu;           /* current CPU */
    int preempt_count;   /* 0 => preemptable, <0 => BUG */

    ...
};
```

- Decrement it and we're done
Unwinding the Stack

- Stack is partially corrupted from overflow
- Need to restore it to recoverable state
- Walk up stack from current location until we match a signature of a known good state
- Adjust ESP to good state, and return
Refresher: What Have We Achieved?

- Trigger the overflow, gain control of EIP
- Leverage ROP to mark softirq stack executable, jump into shellcode
- Search for intact ROSE frame on kernel heap, mark executable, jump into it
- Install kernel backdoor by hooking ICMP handler
- Do some necessary cleanup and unwind stack for safe return from softirq
Kernel Backdoors for Fun and Profit

(Insert “backdoor” joke)
What About That Backdoor Part?

- Whenever an ICMP packet is received, our hook is called

- Check for magic tag in ICMP header

- Two distinct types of packets
  - “Install” packets contain userland shellcode
  - “Trigger” packets cause shellcode to execute

- May be sent independently
  - Install payload, trigger it repeatedly at later date
Backdoor Strategy

- Problem: ICMP handler also runs in softirq context
  - Want userland code execution

- Phase 1: transition to kernel-mode process context

- Phase 2: hijack userland control flow
Backdoor Phase 1

1. **Install userland payload**
2. **Hook system call**
3. **Continue execution**

- Check for magic tag and packet type
- If “install” packet, copy userland payload into safe place (softirq stack)
Transition to Process Context

- If “trigger” packet, need to transition to process context
- Easiest way: hook system call

Install userland payload

Hook system call

Continue execution
System Call Hijacking

▪ How to find system call table at runtime?
  ▫ sidt instruction retrieves IDT address
  ▫ Find handler for INT 0x80 (syscall)
  ▫ Scan function for byte pattern calling into syscall table

▪ Read-only syscall table
  ▫ More flipping write-protect bit in %cr0

▪ Store original syscall handler for later, write address of hook into syscall table
Carry On...

- Want working ICMP stack
- Call original ICMP handler
Backdoor Phase 2

- We've copied userland payload to kernel memory
- Some process comes along and calls our hooked system call...
- Need to hijack process for userland code execution
Only Root, Please

- Only interested in root processes

- How to verify?
  - `thread_info → task_struct → cred`
  - Unstable, annoying...

Check root privileges

Inject userland payload

Divert userland execution

Continue execution
System Calls from Kernel Mode?

- System calls are extremely useful abstractions
  - Friendly interface, kernel does most of the work

- Poll: is it possible to call system calls via INT 0x80 from kernel mode?
  - Tally your votes...
System Calls from Kernel Mode!

- Most system calls will work when called from kernel

- Stack switch only occurs on inter-PL interrupts
  - Based on CPL vs. DPL of GDT descriptor
  - Happens on int and iret

- When called from kernel mode, just an ordinary intra-PL interrupt
Exceptions (No Pun Intended)

- Doesn't work quite right with some system calls
  - Some require `pt_regs` (per-thread register) structure
  - Assumptions about state of stack at time of system call

- fork, execve, iopl, vm86old, sigreturn, clone, vm86, rt_sigreturn, sigaltstack, vfork
Checking for Root

- Easy: load %eax with 0x18 (getuid), INT 0x80
- Check %eax (return code) for 0
- If not zero, call original syscall handler for hooked function
- If zero, unhook syscall and continue payload
Lethal Injection

- Kernel stack contains pointer to saved userland %esp
- Copy userland payload from kernel memory to userland stack
Let it Run...

- Userland stack is non-executable (NX)
- Call mprotect syscall via INT 0x80 to mark userland stack executable
It's a Diversion!

- Need to redirect userland control flow
- Kernel stack contains pointer to saved userland `%eip`
- Give original saved `%eip` to userland shellcode for later
- Overwrite pointer with address of payload on userland stack
Keep on Running

- Want hijacked process to keep running
- Jump to original handler for hijacked system call
Userland Payloads

▪ Use your imagination!
  ▫ Connect-back root shells work just fine

▪ Payloads are prefixed with stub that keeps hijacked process running
  ▫ Fork new process
  ▫ Child runs shellcode
  ▫ Parent jumps to original saved %eip
ROSE Exploitation Demo
Future Work

No, this isn't a perfect exploit.
Hard-Coding

▪ Advantages over signatures / fingerprinting
  ▫ Reliability vs. portability

▪ On PAE kernel, ROP gadgets seem unavoidable
  ▫ Minimize number of ROP gadgets
  ▫ Minimize hard-coding of other data structures

▪ On non-PAE kernel, situation is better
  ▫ Can survive with one JMP ESP (if you know saved EIP offset)
  ▫ Partial overwrites or spraying possible
Future Work: Offense

▪ Remote fingerprinting of kernel
  ▫ Automatic generation of ROP gadgets

▪ Exploiting other packet families
  ▫ IrDA, Bluetooth, X.25?

▪ Finding that TCP/IP bug that breaks the Internet
Future Work: Defense

▪ Randomize kernel base at boot
  ▫ Prevents code reuse (e.g. ROP) remotely in absence of remote kernel memory disclosure

▪ Fuzz and audit networking protocols more rigorously

▪ Inline functions that alter page permissions directly (prevent easy ROP)

▪ Policies on preventing page permission modification after initialization
Thanks To...

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- twiz, sgrakkyu
Questions?

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Exploit code:
https://github.com/djrbliss/rose-exploit