

Anatomy of a Remote Kernel Exploit

Dan Rosenberg



Who am I?

- Security consultant and vulnerability researcher at Virtual Security Research in Boston
 - App/net pentesting, code review, etc.
 - Published some bugs
 - Rooted a few Android phones
 - Focus on Linux kernel
 - Research on kernel exploitation and mitigation

Agenda

- Motivation
- Challenges of remote exploitation
- Prior work
- Case study: ROSE remote stack overflow
 - Exploitation
 - Backdoor
- Future work

Motivation

Why am I giving this talk?

Why Remote Kernel Exploits?

- Instant root
 - No need to escalate privileges
- Remote userland exploitation is hard!
 - Full ASLR + NX/DEP
 - Sandboxing
 - Reduced privileges

Goals of This Talk

- Sorry, not actually an amateur radio talk
- Exploit development methodology
- Individual bugs vs. exploit techniques
- Discuss next steps for kernel hardening

Challenges of Remote Kernel Exploitation

Wait, so you mean this is kind of hard?

Warning: Fragile

- Consequence of failed remote userland exploit:
 - Crash application/service, wait until restarted
 - Crash child process, try again immediately
- Consequence of failed remote kernel exploit:
 - Kernel panic, game over

Lack of Environment Control

- Typical local kernel exploit:
 - Can trigger allocation of heap structures
 - Can trigger calling of function pointers
 - High amount of information leakage available to local users

- Remote kernel exploit:
 - ?

Escape From Interrupt Context

- Many remote kernel issues occur in interrupt context
 - Asynchronous networking events
- End goal: userland code execution (remote shell)
 - How do we get there?
 - No process backing execution
- Need to transition
 - Interrupt context to process context to userland


Prior Work

What's been done before?


A Few Statistics

- 18 known exploits for 16 vulnerabilities
 - 19 authors
 - 9 with full public source code
 - 3 with partial or PoC source
- Wide range of platforms
 - Solaris and OS X still need some remote love


By Operating System



By Vulnerability Class



By Year



Highlights

- Barnaby Jack: Step into the Ring 0 (August 2005)
 - First publication on remote kernel exploitation
 - Transition to userland and kernel backdoor
- Sinan Eren: GREENAPPLE (May 2006)
 - First remote kernel exploit in Immunity CANVAS

Highlights (cont.)

- hdm, skape, Johnny Cache (November 2006)
 - Broadcom, Dlink, and Netgear wifi drivers
 - First remote kernel exploits in Metasploit
- Alfredo Ortega, Gerardo Richarte: OpenBSD IPv6 mbuf overflow (April 2007)
 - First public remote kernel heap overflow
 - Bypasses userland NX

Highlights (cont.)

- Kostya Kortchinsky: MS08-001 (January 2008)
 - Immunity CANVAS
 - First publicized remote Windows kernel pool overflow
- sgrakkyu: sctp-houdini (April 2009)
 - First remote Linux sl*b overflow
 - Introduced vsyscall trick to transition from interrupt context to userland

Observations

- Majority stack overflows, but none dealt with NX kernel stack
 - Let's fix that
- No Linux interrupt context stack overflows
 - sgrakkyu and twiz showed us how in Phrack 64, let's do it in real life
- Wireless drivers suck
 - Six 802.11 remote kernel exploits

Building the Exploit

Or: How I Learned to Stop Worrying and
Love the Ham

Target: 32-bit x86 PAE Kernel

- Kernel has NX support (CONFIG_DEBUG_RODATA)
 - Only enforced on PAE (32-bit) or 64-bit kernels
- Can't execute first-stage shellcode on kernel stack
- Can't introduce code into userspace without proper page permissions
- No vsyscall trick for easy transitions

Test Setup

- Attacker and victim VMs (Ubuntu 10.04)
- Debugging using KGDB over virtual serial port (host pipe)
- BPQ (AX.25 over Ethernet)
- Except for glue code, exploit written entirely in x86 assembly

Famous Last Words

Debian Security Advisory DSA-2240-1:

Dan ~~Rosenburg~~ reported two issues in the Linux implementation of the Amateur Radio X.25 PLP (Rose) protocol. A remote user can cause a **denial of service** by providing specially crafted facilities fields.

Intro to ROSE

- Rarely used amateur radio protocol
- Provides network layer on top of AX.25's link layer
- Uses 10-digit addresses and AX.25 callsigns
- Static routing only

CVE-2011-1493

- On initiating a ROSE connection, parties exchange facilities (supported features)
- FAC_NATIONAL_DIGIS allows host to provide list of digipeaters
- Parsing for this field reads length value from frame and copies digipeater addresses without bounds checking, causing a stack overflow

Sad Code :-)


```
...
l = p[1];
...
else if (*p == FAC_NATIONAL_DIGIS) {
    fac_national_digis_received = 1;
    facilities->source_ndigis = 0;
    facilities->dest_ndigis    = 0;
    for (pt = p + 2, lg = 0 ; lg < l ; pt += AX25_ADDR_LEN, lg += AX25_ADDR_LEN) {
        if (pt[6] & AX25_HBIT)
            memcpy(&facilities->dest_digis[facilities->dest_ndigis++], pt, AX25_ADDR_LEN);
        else
            memcpy(&facilities->source_digis[facilities->source_ndigis++], pt, AX25_ADDR_LEN);
    }
}
...

```


Constraint #1

- The seventh byte of an AX.25 address is AND'd with AX25_HBIT (0x80) if it's a destination digipeater
 - Otherwise, treated as a source digipeater
- Every seventh byte of our payload needs to be consistently greater or less than 0x80, or we'll copy into the wrong array
- Requires manual tweaking

Plan of Attack



Triggering the Bug



- Fairly trivial
- Modify ROSE facilities output functions to craft frame with overly large length field for `FAC_NATIONAL_DIGIS`, followed by lots of NOPs (0x90)

Evil ROSE Frame


ROSE header	Facilities Total Length = XX	0x00	FAC_NATIONAL	FAC_NATIONAL_DIGIS	len = 0xff	0x9090...
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Got EIP

- Recompile ROSE module, reload, and use `rose_call` to initiate connection to target
- Overflowed softirq stack (interrupt handler)

```
Program received signal SIGSEGV,
Segmentation fault.
[Switching to Thread 1456]
0x90909090 in ?? ()
(gdb) i r
eax                0x0          0
ecx                0xde3a5f3c  -566599876
edx                0x296       662
ebx                0x90909090  -1869574000
esp                0xd11e199c  0xd11e199c
ebp                0x90909090  0x90909090
esi                0x90909090  -1869574000
edi                0x90909090  -1869574000
eip                0x90909090  0x90909090
eflags            0x10286     [ PF SF IF RF ]
cs                 0x60        96
ss                 0x68        104
ds                 0x9090007b  -1869610885
es                 0x9090007b  -1869610885
fs                 0xffff     65535
gs                 0xffff     65535
```

How to Execute Code?



- Traditionally, return into shellcode on stack
- Problem 1: we don't know where we are
 - Trampolines are easy
- Problem 2: softirq stack is non-executable

Review: ROP

- We control the return address and data at %esp
- Each return will direct execution to address at stack pointer and increment it
- Chain together function epilogues (“gadgets”) to perform arbitrary computation
- Relies on homogeneity of distribution (binary) kernels and lack of randomization
 - Choose gadgets that are more likely to appear in constant locations across kernels

Making our Stack Executable

- Kernel has nice function to do this for us:

- set_memory_x()

- Calling convention has arguments in registers

- ROP stub steps:

- Load (%esp & ~0xffff) into %eax

- Load 4 into %edx

- Call set_memory_x()

- Jump into stack

```
static unsigned long rop_stub[] = {
/*1*/  PUSH_ESP_POP_EAX,
/*4*/  0xffffffff,
      0xffffffff,
/*3*/  0xffffffff,

      ALIGN_EAX,
/*2*/  0xffffffff,
      0xffffffff,


/*1*/  RET,

/*4*/  POP_EDX,
      0x00000004,
/*3*/  0xffffffff,
      0xffffffff,
/*2*/  0xffffffff,
      0xffffffff,

/*1*/  RET,

/*4*/  SET_MEMORY_X,
      JMP_ESP,
};
```

Overcoming Space Constraints




- We now have traditional shellcode executing on the softirq stack!
- Problem: length is limited to 0xff (255), minus what we've already used
- Not enough room for a useful payload

Needle in a Haystack

- Full ROSE frame is intact somewhere on the kernel heap
- Pointer to a memory region containing our socket data lives on the stack
- Walk up the stack, following kernel heap pointers
- Search general area for tag included in ROSE frame
- Mark it executable and jump to it

What Now?



- We can execute arbitrary-length payloads now!
- Goal: install kernel backdoor in ICMP handler

Protocol Handlers

```
/* Array of network protocol structure */
const struct net_protocol __rcu
*inet_protos[MAX_INET_PROTOS] __read_mostly;


/* Definition of network protocol structure */
struct net_protocol {
    int (*handler)(struct sk_buff *skb);
    void (*err_handler)(struct sk_buff *skb, u32 info);
    ...
};

/* Standard well-defined IP protocols. */
enum {
    IPPROTO_IP = 0, /* Dummy protocol for TCP */
    IPPROTO_ICMP = 1, /* Internet Control Message Protocol */
    ...
};
```


Hooking ICMP

- Storage on softirq stack
 - Already executable, safe, persistent
- Copy hook and address of original ICMP handler
 - We'll need this later
- Handler is in read-only memory
 - Flip write-protect bit in %cr0 register
- Write address of our hook into ICMP handler function pointer

Hooked In



Time to Rebuild...



- We've destroyed large portions of the softirq stack
- How can we keep the kernel running?

Cleaning Up the Locks

- ROSE protocol is holding two spinlocks
 - If we don't release these, the ROSE stack will deadlock soon
- Problem: ROSE is a module, we don't know where the locks live



Needle in a Haystack, Again

- Global modules variable: linked list of loaded kernel modules
- A plan!
 - Follow linked list until we find ROSE module
 - Read module structure, find start of .data section
 - Scan .data section for byte pattern of two consecutive spinlocks (distinctive signature)
 - Release them

Preemption Woes

- Preemption count must be consistent with what the kernel is expecting, or scheduler will...

...complain and fix it for you?!

```
if (unlikely(prev_count != preempt_count())) {  
    printk(KERN_ERR "huh, entered softirq %u %s %p"  
           "with preempt_count %08x, "  
           " exited with %08x?\n", vec_nr,  
           softirq_to_name[vec_nr], h->action,  
           prev_count, preempt_count());  
    preempt_count() = prev_count;  
}
```

- Let's avoid that warning...


Has Anybody Seen a Preemption Count?

- Preempt count lives at known location in thread_info struct, at base of kernel stack:

```
struct thread_info {
    struct task_struct *task; /* main task structure */
    struct exec_domain *exec_domain; /* execution domain */
    __u32 flags; /* low level flags */
    __u32 status; /* thread synchronous flags */
    __u32 cpu; /* current CPU */
    int preempt_count; /* 0 => preemptable,
                       <0 => BUG */
    ...
};
```

- Decrement it and we're done

Unwinding the Stack



- Stack is partially corrupted from overflow
- Need to restore it to recoverable state
- Walk up stack from current location until we match a signature of a known good state
- Adjust ESP to good state, and return

Refresher: What Have We Achieved?

- Trigger the overflow, gain control of EIP
- Leverage ROP to mark softirq stack executable, jump into shellcode
- Search for intact ROSE frame on kernel heap, mark executable, jump into it
- Install kernel backdoor by hooking ICMP handler
- Do some necessary cleanup and unwind stack for safe return from softirq

Kernel Backdoors for Fun and Profit

(Insert “backdoor” joke)


What About That Backdoor Part?

- Whenever an ICMP packet is received, our hook is called
- Check for magic tag in ICMP header
- Two distinct types of packets
 - “Install” packets contain userland shellcode
 - “Trigger” packets cause shellcode to execute
- May be sent independently
 - Install payload, trigger it repeatedly at later date

Backdoor Strategy


- Problem: ICMP handler also runs in softirq context
 - Want userland code execution
- Phase 1: transition to kernel-mode process context
- Phase 2: hijack userland control flow

Backdoor Phase I



- Check for magic tag and packet type
- If “install” packet, copy userland payload into safe place (softirq stack)

Transition to Process Context




- If “trigger” packet, need to transition to process context
- Easiest way: hook system call

System Call Hijacking

- How to find system call table at runtime?
 - `sidt` instruction retrieves IDT address
 - Find handler for INT 0x80 (syscall)
 - Scan function for byte pattern calling into syscall table
- Read-only syscall table
 - More flipping write-protect bit in `%cr0`
- Store original syscall handler for later, write address of hook into syscall table

Carry On...




- Want working ICMP stack
- Call original ICMP handler

Backdoor Phase 2

- We've copied userland payload to kernel memory
- Some process comes along and calls our hooked system call...
- Need to hijack process for userland code execution

Only Root, Please



- Only interested in root processes
- How to verify?
 - `thread_info` → `task_struct` → `cred`
 - Unstable, annoying...

System Calls from Kernel Mode?

- System calls are extremely useful abstractions
 - Friendly interface, kernel does most of the work
- Poll: is it possible to call system calls via INT 0x80 from kernel mode?
 - Tally your votes...

System Calls from Kernel Mode!

- Most system calls will work when called from kernel
- Stack switch only occurs on inter-PL interrupts
 - Based on CPL vs. DPL of GDT descriptor
 - Happens on `int` and `iret`
- When called from kernel mode, just an ordinary intra-PL interrupt


Exceptions (No Pun Intended)

- Doesn't work quite right with some system calls
 - Some require `pt_regs` (per-thread register) structure
 - Assumptions about state of stack at time of system call
- `fork`, `execve`, `iopl`, `vm86old`, `sigreturn`, `clone`, `vm86`, `rt_sigreturn`, `sigaltstack`, `vfork`

Checking for Root


- Easy: load %eax with 0x18 (getuid), INT 0x80
- Check %eax (return code) for 0
- If not zero, call original syscall handler for hooked function
- If zero, unhook syscall and continue payload

Lethal Injection




- Kernel stack contains pointer to saved userland %esp
- Copy userland payload from kernel memory to userland stack

Let it Run...




- Userland stack is non-executable (NX)
- Call mprotect syscall via INT 0x80 to mark userland stack executable

It's a Diversion!



- Need to redirect userland control flow
- Kernel stack contains pointer to saved userland %eip
- Give original saved %eip to userland shellcode for later
- Overwrite pointer with address of payload on userland stack

Keep on Running



- Want hijacked process to keep running
- Jump to original handler for hijacked system call

Userland Payloads

- Use your imagination!
 - Connect-back root shells work just fine
- Payloads are prefixed with stub that keeps hijacked process running
 - Fork new process
 - Child runs shellcode
 - Parent jumps to original saved %eip

ROSE Exploitation Demo

Future Work

No, this isn't a perfect exploit.

Hard-Coding

- Advantages over signatures / fingerprinting
 - Reliability vs. portability
- On PAE kernel, ROP gadgets seem unavoidable
 - Minimize number of ROP gadgets
 - Minimize hard-coding of other data structures
- On non-PAE kernel, situation is better
 - Can survive with one JMP ESP (if you know saved EIP offset)
 - Partial overwrites or spraying possible

Future Work: Offense

- Remote fingerprinting of kernel
 - Automatic generation of ROP gadgets
- Exploiting other packet families
 - IrDA, Bluetooth, X.25?
- Finding that TCP/IP bug that breaks the Internet

Future Work: Defense

- Randomize kernel base at boot
 - Prevents code reuse (e.g. ROP) remotely in absence of remote kernel memory disclosure
- Fuzz and audit networking protocols more rigorously
- Inline functions that alter page permissions directly (prevent easy ROP)
- Policies on preventing page permission modification after initialization

Thanks To...

- Ralf Baechle
- Nelson Elhage
- Kees Cook
- twiz, sgrakkyu

Questions?

E-mail: drosenberg@vsecurity.com

Twitter: [@djrbliss](https://twitter.com/djrbliss)

Company:

<http://www.vsecurity.com>

Personal:

<http://www.vulnfactory.org>

Exploit code:

<https://github.com/djrbliss/rose-exploit>

